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Review of Adam Hanieh, Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2011).
This important, original work should be read by anyone with an interest in the political economy
of the Middle East. Adam Hanieh crafts a compelling case that the process of capitalist class
formation in the Arab Gulf has created a pan-Gulf elite, “Khaleeji capital.” “Rapidly and in
‘hothouse’ fashion,” he writes, this class grew “from state-supported and family-based trading
groups in the 1960s and 1970s to the domination of a few massive conglomerates in the
contemporary period” with a “hierarchical structure around a Saudi-UAE axis.” The process, he
argues, is tightly interlinked with the US-dominated transformation of global capitalism from the
Golden Age through the neoliberal era, making the Gulf the hub of the region and relegating the
economies of the Mediterranean, western Asia and South Asia to its periphery. Hanieh
concludes: “The entire Middle East is increasingly moving to a single beat -- inextricably linked
to the rhythms of accumulation and class formation in the Gulf.” He predicts that the importance
of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states for the supply of hydrocarbons, petrochemicals
and financial flows to the world market will continue to grow, making the Gulf “a decisive factor
for the future trajectory of global capitalism.”
The book is tightly organized around a core theory and methodology, which the author uses
systematically throughout its seven chapters. It also seamlessly interweaves economic and
political history, logically integrates analysis of Gulf economic transformation with that of global
capitalism, and effectively deploys the author’s original research among Gulf-based
conglomerates. Its weakness, aside from the smaller matter of lack of clarity in the use of some
economic concepts, is the author’s downplaying of core contradictions within the processes of
Gulf class formation and global accumulation. The book is thus in danger of overstating the
strength of its conclusions.
The opening chapter efficiently reviews colonial history and the emergence of the monarchical
structures that dominate Gulf Arab polities to this day. It then offers a collegial critique of rentier
state theory, and explains the alternative theory that shapes the rest of the book. Rentier state
theory, Hanieh argues, is limited insofar as it rests on the premise that the state is an established,
free-standing entity. It also treats natural resource revenues as the result of a simple commodity
exchange and ignores the formation of a true private bourgeoisie with its own dynamic. His
historical materialist method, in contrast, posits state formation and class formation as coprocesses in the evolution of capitalism, complete with internal contradictions such as how to
harness surplus revenues to promote accumulation in the long run, how to manage the inevitable
conflict between the interests of the working class and those of capital, and how to enable the
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state to operate on behalf of the whole of the capitalist class rather than particular individuals. In
this approach, hydrocarbon production, sale and revenue are not things or events but rather the
material expression of processes embedded in the social relations of accumulation.
Hanieh uses the Marxian tool of the circuit of capital -- with its sub-circuits of production,
exchange and finance -- as a consistent method for analyzing the evolution of Gulf Arab
capitalism and the accumulation process. This concept of accumulation captures the drive for
private profit, economic growth based on an expanding social surplus product of labor,
concentration and centralization of economic power, and internationalization of all three circuits.
The use of this model provides structure and clarity to the argument, but its application in later
chapters would have benefited from precise definitions of key concepts, such as the rate of
exploitation, the price of labor power, primitive accumulation, and concentration and
centralization, either there or where they first appear.
Hanieh provides the global historical context for Gulf transformation in two non-consecutive
chapters (2 and 4). The first describes the evolution of global capitalism from the end of World
War II to 1990, and how the emergence of the United States as the dominant world-capitalist
power was interdependent with that of the Gulf as “a major node of world capitalism.” The
second shows how the advent of neoliberalism in the 1980s and the demise of the Soviet Union
and the opening of China to the global market in the 1990s enhanced both the role of the United
States as the sole “hyperpower” and that of the Gulf as the linchpin of US-led global economic
policy in its roles as provider of hydrocarbons to the world (production), major purchaser of
capital and consumer goods (exchange), and key supplier of petrodollars to the US-dominated
financial system (finance). While the concluding chapter of the book discusses the financial
collapse and recession of 2008-2010 and the continuing threat of cycles of over-accumulation
and deflationary crisis, here the author takes the economic, political and military dominance of
the United States, and the strength of its alliance with the GCC, as given and unchanging.
Alternating chapters (3 and 5) focus directly on capitalist transformation in the Gulf in the same
two eras, 1960-1990 and 1990-2010, based on Hanieh’s rich research among the top GCC
conglomerates. After independence, for example, the ruling regimes hastened to confront the
early appearance of socialist and Arab nationalist movements and, eventually, to replace an
uppity Arab working class with a non-Arab, mostly South Asian, largely powerless and
disposable proletariat (the “spatial fix” to managing the capital-labor contradiction). By the
1970s, the Gulf states were redirecting oil revenues to enhance the economic power of ruling
families and to facilitate primitive accumulation for a rising capitalist class made up of citizens
favored by the rulers, including traditional merchants and tribal leaders, who became the core of
a private sector beholden to, yet distinguishable from, the state. Primitive accumulation entailed,
on one hand, the creation of capital and private productive property where none existed before,
such as in land, small business and subcontracting, and, on the other hand, providing access to a
cheap, docile, non-owning working class. This process generated the formation of specifically
“Khaleeji capital” in the 1990s and 2000s, a class that subsumed the simple national-capitalist
family-based groups from earlier decades. These pan-GCC corporate entities are both interlinked
with their national governments’ economic programs and dominant in virtually all industries and
circuits of the Gulf private-sector economy.
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The elegance of these arguments is qualified by the author’s lack of precision in use of some
economic tools. For one thing, the depression in oil prices during the latter part of the 1980s and
the 1990s led to lower surplus revenues or even negative current account balances and
concomitant declines in investment and economic growth, but Hanieh’s verbal description leaves
the impression that revenues and petrodollars continued to flow unabated in these years, and that
the Gulf governments simply intensified their protection and promotion of their private capitalist
classes. Another problem is not adjusting for price inflation, showing only nominal GDP growth
and touting the “annual double-digit growth in GFCF” -- gross fixed capital formation, a
measure of magnitude of investment -- in nominal terms in the 2000s. This assertion ignores the
rate of price inflation afflicting the Gulf economies, partly because their currencies were pegged
to the US dollar and hydrocarbon transactions were denominated in dollars, and partly because
the costs of imported capital and consumer goods were rising quickly during the global boom of
the 2000s.
The role of Khaleeji capital in the Middle East “periphery” is presented in the penultimate
chapter. Hanieh provides valuable information about Khaleeji capital’s growing importance -- its
influence on West Bank “development” institutions, its takeover of major banks in Lebanon,
Egypt and Jordan in the 2000s, and its rush to invest in post-Saddam Iraq, where US firms feared
to tread. This chapter is the weakest, however, because, seemingly uncritically, the author
accepts the insulting notion of center-periphery relations between the Gulf Arab states and their
neighbors that became fashionable among neoliberal cheerleaders during the 2000-2008 boom.
Without mentioning the steep decline in Gulf investment in Mediterranean economies in 2009
and 2010, he expects that “the extraction of profits and the transfer of wealth from these
peripheral regions to the GCC” will just grow stronger in the coming years. No mention is made
of the elephant in the room -- Iran and Iraq are also Gulf economies, with regimes that may not
be molded easily to the GCC capitalist design and that may well contest it in the future.
Furthermore, the manuscript was apparently finished before the Arab uprisings of 2011, which
may pose a test for Hanieh’s prediction.
The concluding chapter describes the dramatic impact of the 2008 financial crisis and 2009
recession on the Gulf economies, yet ends with the same, almost triumphalist, note taken in the
previous chapter. Hanieh argues that, despite the fall in hydrocarbon prices and current account
balances, the collapse in value of domestic assets in real estate and the stock market, and the
suspension or cancellation of debt-based projects from the boom years, Khaleeji capital emerged
stronger than ever from the crisis. Not only did hydrocarbon prices and current account surpluses
resurge quickly, but national governments bailed out ailing private-sector firms, stimulated
domestic economies through active fiscal and monetary policy, applied the “spatial fix” by
repatriating surplus immigrant labor, thus passing the worst of the crisis to those workers’
countries of origin, and encouraged banks to merge. These governments even reaffirmed
commitment to a single Gulf currency, the pure monetary expression of the conquest by Khaleeji
capital of old-fashioned nation-states.
Hanieh recognizes core ambivalences in the class transformation and accumulation processes he
describes, such as “the sharp contradictions between the region’s poor and marginalized classes
and GCC and other elites,” between the pan-GCC nature of the private conglomerates and their
intimate linkage to their own national governments, and between reliance on an imported
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proletariat and the increase of unemployment among the citizenry. He concludes, however, that
global accumulation’s continued dependence on hydrocarbons and petrodollars is most likely to
turn Gulf capital’s rising power into an inexorable juggernaut. Is this conclusion overstating the
case? Considering the Arab uprisings, the weak economic recovery in Europe and North
America, and Western military failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, Gulf capital’s conquest of the
region and promotion to world power may not go so smoothly in the coming years.
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